War Resister Ordered Deported

Canada No Longer a Safe Haven for U.S .War Resisters: A Response to Ottawa’s Decision to Deport Corey Glass

Toronto: As signatories to the War Resisters Declaration, our concern for conscientious objectors around the world leads us to speak out against the decision today to order the first deportation of a U.S. war resister who had come to Canada seeking refuge. (...)

Corey Glass is a Sergeant in the United States National Guard. In July 2006, after his first tour of service in Iraq, Corey Glass fled to Canada, and applied for refugee status, which was refused.

Today, Glass was informed by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration that he is at no risk of persecution in being sent back to the United States and, moreover, that he will not be allowed to stay in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.

Although many may say, “Well, he volunteered, he should be willing to suffer the consequences of his actions”, we believe this is a misguided understanding about consequence and conscience. Punishment should not be the product of conscientious action. Rather it is the result of conscience being met by callousness and a closed heart. In the best of worlds, conscientious objections open our eyes and hearts to see another view of the world as it is, and call upon us, at minimum, to not be complacent and, at best, to work for change and redress.

Corey Glass came to Canada after his military duty in Iraq led him to realize that he had a conscientious objection to the war – its objectives and the way that it was being fought, with clear violations of international law.

Some may also question whether members of an “all-volunteer army” have any rights of asylum. The UNHCR Handbook on Refugees, the standard-bearer for such questions, says they do. To qualify for asylum, a soldier must “show that the performance of military service would have required his participation in military action contrary to his genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience.” Being in disagreement with one’s government is not enough, unless “the type of military action…is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft-evasion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution.”

Many countries, including Canada, refused to participate in the Iraq war because it was not sanctioned by the Security Council. Many churches and citizens in Canada and around the world opposed the war . And, in 2004, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, declared that “[The Iraq War] was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal.”

The Iraq War’s human rights abuses, particularly related to torture and unjust detention, have been condemned in the press and by international human rights organizations. What further evidence is needed to demonstrate that a refusal to serve in this war meets the burden of proof for international condemnation? Volunteering for the army does not mean that a soldier signs away their conscience – or their rights.

Sadly, today, Canada failed Corey Glass. But more than that, it has failed Canadians who themselves believe in protecting not only those who are at risk of torture or persecution, but also those who have “done the right thing”. Their punishment will be tantamount to persecution.

And Canada, which so warmly welcomed tens of thousands of men and women - draft dodgers, deserters, conscientious objectors – from Viet Nam and other wars, has regrettably taken a step backwards in demonstrating moral stewardship.

For the war resisters, their good faith was abused by an administration that misled them about the basis of the war (“weapons of mass destruction”; links to 9/11). It took courage for them to say “no” and even more courage to leave all that is familiar behind and come to Canada. And now they are being betrayed by the country that for so many others has been a safe haven.

Punishment was not a requisite outcome for these conscientious objectors but it will be their destiny unless Canadians themselves speak up and tell the Government of Canada to not deport these young people and to let them stay.

Canadian Friends Service Committee (Quakers)
The United Church of Canada
Mennonite Central Committee – Canada
American Friends Service Committee (Quakers)

Don't feed the hungry, Abbotsford church pastor told

Business folk, councillors want food handouts to homeless to stop

Kent Spencer and Jack Keating
The Province
May 16, 2008

An Abbotsford church pastor says he won't stop feeding the hungry just because a business group has demanded he stop.

Defying the group's request to cease operations, Pastor Christoph Reiners set up shop at Jubilee Park in downtown Abbotsford Thursday.

"Food changes your outlook on life. People treat each other better when they have a full stomach," said Reiners, pastor of the Peace Lutheran church. Pastor Christoph Reiners has been asked by the Abbotsford Business Improvement Association to stop feeding homeless people in Jubilee Park. (...)

Pastor Christoph Reiners has been asked by the Abbotsford Business Improvement Association to stop feeding homeless people in Jubilee Park.

"This program is owned by our congregation. They feel they can help." About 20 homeless people were given Cheerios, muffins and coffee at the McCallum Road park, which has been the scene of drug deals, prostitution and fights. The Abbotsford Business Improvement Association wants him to stop the food giveaway, saying it attracts undesirables. The request is supported by Abbotsford councillors Bruce Beck, Lynne Harris and John Smith. "The perception is that these programs, however well-intentioned, are attracting large numbers of indigent people to the park," said Smith. "Businesses, neighbours and seniors have complained." Association president Bob Bos said the handouts attract more trouble from others who swell the numbers.
"Jubilee is a really nice little park, overrun with drug dealers and prostitutes," Bos said. "It's classified as a broken park. Kids don't play in the playground.

"When the church started delivering food six weeks ago, the problems escalated. At a nearby centre, seniors are afraid to get out of their cars. "We asked the church to stop feeding [the homeless] at the park or feed them at their church [1.8 kilometres away]. They told us, 'You can't stop us.' They're right, because anybody can have a picnic in the park."

Tenants at his commercial building a block away grumble about the human waste left at the front door, Bos said. "It's gross. I can hardly get in. If there wasn't coffee and Cheerios, the homeless would go someplace else." But others jumped to the defence of the down and out. "The [association] isn't interested in a solution," said Les Talvio of the Cyrus Centre, a Christian organization that helps troubled people. "They think if the Cheerios go, the people will go, too. They don't get it. "The church is engaging people by being in the park. We're sending people to shelters and giving them information."

Lilly Kaetler, a member of the Clearbrook Neighbourhood Watch, agreed. "Stopping the delivery of food won't change anything. Police will clean out the aggressive ones. The others need help."

There were about eight homeless and street people hanging out in the park late yesterday afternoon. All were supportive of the pastor's breakfast program. "I think it's a great idea," said Big Joe, sitting at a picnic table with a group of men. "This town of Abbotsford is supposed to be filled with God-fearing people, and all the politicians are supposed to be God-fearing, and nobody's doing anything about the homeless crisis. It's a joke.

"This guy is doing something about it. God bless him. This gentleman here is doing the right thing, he's feeding the homeless. It's the right thing to do." Others agreed. "They're doing a wonderful thing," said Fred, who wouldn't give his last name. "There are people starving in the park." Reiners said the church's "very modest project" would continue. "I wish we could do more," he said.

He said there is a "homeless problem everywhere in the Lower Mainland" and it will take a "collaborative effort" to solve the problem. "We certainly need some leadership from governments," said Reiners, after handing out breakfast for the seventh consecutive Thursday. "And I think churches are willing to do what they can."

He said the park is an appropriate place to help the homeless and they clean up before leaving.
"This is a public space and this is better than a residential neighbourhood or hanging out in front of businesses," he said. "What they need is housing, but if [governments] are not going to provide them with housing, detox programs and services for those who suffer from mental illness, this is where they're going to be."

Why are we here today at the Supreme Court?

This is the statement read inside the Supreme Court on January 11, 2008-- the date that marked six years of torture and abuse at the U.S. detention center at Guantánamo Bay.

January 11, 2008

We come to the Supreme Court today because it is the sixth anniversary of the opening of Guantánamo prison as a place where men, given the devious label "enemy combatant" have been held in indefinite detention, inhuman conditions, isolation and torture. We are here to bring their plight and the plight of all prisoners from this current war, to the "highest court in the land." We are here to make their suffering visible, to make their voices heard, to make their humanity felt. (...)

Lawyers from the Center for Constitutional Rights and other organizations are working hard to bring the cases of the prisoners into the courts. But the lawyers can only do so much, because these prisoners--who have been illegally detained, and tortured, abused and kept from their families for years--are not even able to communicate openly with their lawyers. And so, after years of despair, many prisoners have lost what confidence they might have had in the legal process. More, highly competent lawyers who have patiently devoted their time and skills at great personal cost, are understandably frustrated because they are unable to conduct what a reasonable person would consider a reasonable defense.

The men at Guantánamo may seem very far from us; they not only have different names and cultures, but they have been relentlessly demonized and dehumanized by government officials who knew all along that almost all of them are innocent of any crime. We come here to bring their stories and assert their humanity, because for six years, men such as Sami al Haji from Sudan and Sabir Lahmar from Algeria have been denied the basic right to come here to present their own defense. We are here to tell these stories.

So we come to the Supreme Court on this January 11th to let the nine justices--who hold so much power over these men-- know that we care about the prisoners, that we are watching, that we expect and demand justice. Some of the recent Supreme Court rulings on the Guantánamo prisoners appear to be reasonable, but so far they have proven ineffective in securing even the most basic rights which accused persons should have--rights guaranteed by the fundamental laws and practices of U.S. society and by civilized nations all over the world. Again and again, an intimidated Congress--even the Democratic Congress elected with a mandate to reverse the Administration's abuses--has lacked the will to restore basic rights which everyone deserves.

We are here today to appeal to the Supreme Court Justices to stand up now to assert decisively an end to torture; to assert decisively the abolition of secret prisons supposedly outside the realm of law; and above all, to assert decisively the right of habeas corpus, the most crucial protection of any democratic society.

Although the justices don't always have the empire's poor and marginalized as their first concern, we appeal to them as people of conscience and humanity to do justice, love kindness, and walk humbly.

GUANTÁNAMO DETAINEES TO GET THEIR DAY IN COURT

Witness Against Torture Activists to "Represent" Detainees in Trial, May 27

Frida Berrigan

WASHINGTON, DC – Detainees at the U.S. Military Prison in Guantánamo will finally get their day in court on May 27 – Superior Court, in Washington DC.

That is when 35 Americans from cities and towns across the country will go on trial for a protest at the U.S. Supreme Court on January 11, 2008. They face charges of either "unlawful free speech" or "causing a harangue" or both. Each count carries a maximum penalty of 60 days in jail, as well as fines and court fees. (...)

In a new twist on traditional protest, the 35 activists will enter their names as those of actual Guantánamo inmates. On January 11th, they were arrested without their own identification and were taken into custody under the name of a Guantánamo prisoner. This act symbolically grants the Guantánamo prisoners their day in court-- which the Pentagon has denied them for years.

Father Bill Pickard, a Catholic priest from Scranton, PA, is one of the defendants. But he will be tried "as" Faruq Ali Ahmed, a Guantánamo detainee. "I went to the Supreme Court to make a simple plea that the inhumane treatment and actual torture of inmates at Guantánamo Bay stop," says Fr. Pickard. "I went to bring the name and the humanity of Faruq Ali Ahmed — who claims he traveled to Afghanistan in 2001 simply to teach the Koran to children and that he has no affiliation with the Taliban or Al Qaeda — before the law. He cannot do it himself, so I am called by my faith, my respect for the rule of law and my conscience to do it for him." Among the defendants is a hog farmer from Grinnell, Iowa, a social worker from Saratoga Springs, New York, and a legal secretary from Baltimore.

Representing themselves, the defendants plan on justifying their acts as upholding U.S. law and international human rights and will call witnesses to document the abuses at Guantánamo.

Witness Against Torture will hold two events related to the trial on May 27:

At 7:45 am, dressed in orange jumpsuits and black hoods, those facing trial will carry their Guantánamo inmates' names from the U.S. Supreme Court (Maryland Avenue and First Street) to the D.C. Superior Court (Carl Moultrie Court House, 500 Indiana, Ave NW), where their cases will be heard.

At 8:30 am, Witness Against Torture will hold a press conference outside the Superior Court. Defendants and witnesses will address the media. They will also hold a ceremony of justice, expressing their demand that the rights and humanity of the detainees be respected by placing placards bearing the detainees' names alongside copies of the U.S. Constitution, the Geneva Convention, and the sacred texts of various religious traditions.

The trial will begin at 9:30 am. Press is invited to attend all the proceedings.

The January 11 protest was organized by Witness Against Torture (www.witnesstorture.org), which was formed in 2005 when 25 Americans walked from Cuba to the U.S. detention facility at Guantánamo.

Please visit the website for more information, media contacts and to make a contribution to support our work.

To learn more about the trial, the defendants and the movement to shut down Guantánamo, visit www.witnesstorture.org

Trial for Anti-Torture Activists Begins in DC

Brian Terrell is a Catholic Worker from Maloy IA and the Catholic Peace Ministry's Executive Directors. He is along with 3 other Iowans headed to stand trial of an anti-torture protest held at the Supreme Court in Wash DC Jan 11th. The other Iowans are Christine Gaunt of Grinnell and Ed Bloomer and Kirk Brown of the DM Catholic Worker Community.

For more information: Brian Terrell, Catholic Peace
Ministry, Terrellcpm@yahoo.com

Photos and Report on Wed May 21 Ia Air Guard Peace Vigil in DM

What: Weekly Peace Vigil at the Iowa Air National Guard Headquarters in DM
Date: Every Wed.
Time: 4 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.
Place: 3100 McKinley Avenue, Des Moines

REPORT from May 21st Vigil

Six folks; Frank Cordaro, Mona Shaw, Ed Bloomer, Brian Terrell, Elton Davis and Michael Gillespie showed this Wed at the main entrance of the Iowa Air Guard facility (see photo), home of the 132nd Fighter Wing http://www.iadesm.ang.af.mil/ . The vigil site is on the north side of the DM Airport on McKinley Ave. go to a map

This was our 5th Wed. weekly peace vigil at the IA Air National Guard. It was a delightful bright sunny day. Michael Gillespie took the group photo . (...)

We are vigiling at the IA Air Guard because members of the 132nd Fighter Wing are among 250 IA National Guard personal who were recently redeployed to the war in Iraq. According to an April 16, DMRegister story, "The airmen of the 132nd Fighter Wing will launch F-16 aircraft over Iraq to attack enemy forces and search for improvised explosive devices."
http://www.desmoinesregister.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=2008804160374

We will be doing this vigil every Wed until members of the 132ndFighter Wing return to Iowa from Iraq. Our immediate goal is to reach a double digit figure. This week we hit six people - we know there are at least four more good souls willing to join us for these Wed. Vigils.

Also want to remind folks of the other weekly DM area peace vigil that takes place every Thursday every between 11 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. in Nolan Plaza in down town Des Moines. This vigil has been going on for over four years.

So, weather it is our Wed Vigils at the IA Air Guard or the Thursday Vigils at Nolan Plaza - for all you in the DM area - Please Come Join Us!!!

Frank Cordaro
Phil Berrigan CW House
713 Indiana Avenue, Des Moines, IA 50314
www.DesMoinesCatholicWorker.org

Economy stretching individuals, service agencies to the limit

Scott Richardson
Pantagraph, Bloominton IL
May 17, 2008

"The lines got longer about three weeks ago," said Tina Sipula, who founded Clare House as part of the Catholic Worker Movement, which began 75 years ago when journalist-turned-social worker Dorothy Day began feeding the poor in New York City during the Great Depression. "The line looks like Christmas."

read the rest here

We need a second Catonsville

click to enlarge

Call for Haiti Debt Cancellation

Haiti Justice Blog
May 20, 2008

WASHINGTON – With food prices on the rise in Haiti and social unrest in the impoverished nation growing, today Members of Congress, religious and civil rights leaders, and prominent development advocates issued an urgent call to the U.S. Administration to support immediate debt cancellation for the struggling nation.

read the rest here

Daniel Berrigan: Forty Years After Catonsville

Chris Hedges
The Nation
May 20, 2008

Forty years ago this month, Father Daniel Berrigan walked into a draft board in Catonsville, Maryland, with eight other activists, including his brother, Father Philip Berrigan, and removed draft files of young men who were about to be sent to Vietnam. The group carted the files outside and burned them in two garbage cans with homemade napalm. Father Berrigan was tried, found guilty, spent four months as a fugitive from the FBI, was apprehended and sent to prison for eighteen months.

read the rest here

The Police Killing of Frank Paul

Limitations of Public Inquiry & the Power of Protest

Ivan Drury
Against Exceptionalism
May 5 2008

No case has illuminated the blind alley of the police “public inquiry” more clearly than that of the 1998 police killing of Frank Paul in Vancouver. The Frank Paul inquiry, restricted from the beginning from finding fault or laying charges, has the potential of becoming a crossroads from which the entire corrupt policing and “justice” system can begin to be challenged by the communities they have brutalized for hundreds of years.

read the rest here

War Resister denied Humanitarian & Compassionate consideration

News from Toronto this morning:

War Resister Corey Glass received a negative decision in his Humanitarian & Compassionate grounds application today.

We will be holding a press conference at 1 pm EDT to respond to the decision.

Attached is a press release we have sent out on the wire. Below is an urgent action request.

Please forward WIDELY.

In solidarity

the War Resisters Support Campaign

CALL LIBERAL LEADER Stéphane Dion:

613.996.6740 or 613.996.5789

Tell him you want the Liberal Party...

• to support the Parliamentary motion to allow Iraq War resisters to remain in Canada,

• to oppose the deportation of people of conscience who have resisted an illegal war, and

• to support the will of the Canadian people, not Stephen Harper's decision to deport war resisters, and not the U.S.'s war agenda.

• Let Them Stay!

More info: resisters.ca

War Resisters Support Campaign

Vancouver

http://ca.geocities.com/vanresisters/

The Last Roundup

Is the government compiling a secret list of citizens to detain under martial law?

Christopher Ketcham
Radar Magazine
May-June 2008

In the spring of 2007, a retired senior official in the U.S. Justice Department sat before Congress and told a story so odd and ominous, it could have sprung from the pages of a pulp political thriller. It was about a principled bureaucrat struggling to protect his country from a highly classified program with sinister implications. Rife with high drama, it included a car chase through the streets of Washington, D.C., and a tense meeting at the White House, where the president's henchmen made the bureaucrat so nervous that he demanded a neutral witness be present. (...)

The bureaucrat was James Comey, John Ashcroft's second-in-command at the Department of Justice during Bush's first term. Comey had been a loyal political foot soldier of the Republican Party for many years. Yet in his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, he described how he had grown increasingly uneasy reviewing the Bush administration's various domestic surveillance and spying programs. Much of his testimony centered on an operation so clandestine he wasn't allowed to name it or even describe what it did. He did say, however, that he and Ashcroft had discussed the program in March 2004, trying to decide whether it was legal under federal statutes. Shortly before the certification deadline, Ashcroft fell ill with pancreatitis, making Comey acting attorney general, and Comey opted not to certify the program. When he communicated his decision to the White House, Bush's men told him, in so many words, to take his concerns and stuff them in an undisclosed location.

Comey refused to knuckle under, and the dispute came to a head on the cold night of March 10, 2004, hours before the program's authorization was to expire. At the time, Ashcroft was in intensive care at George Washington Hospital following emergency surgery. Apparently, at the behest of President Bush himself, the White House tried, in Comey's words, "to take advantage of a very sick man," sending Chief of Staff Andrew Card and then–White House counsel Alberto Gonzales on a mission to Ashcroft's sickroom to persuade the heavily doped attorney general to override his deputy. Apprised of their mission, Comey, accompanied by a full security detail, jumped in his car, raced through the streets of the capital, lights blazing, and "literally ran" up the hospital stairs to beat them there.

Minutes later, Gonzales and Card arrived with an envelope filled with the requisite forms. Ashcroft, even in his stupor, did not fall for their heavy-handed ploy. "I'm not the attorney general," Ashcroft told Bush's men. "There"—he pointed weakly to Comey—"is the attorney general." Gonzales and Card were furious, departing without even acknowledging Comey's presence in the room. The following day, the classified domestic spying program that Comey found so disturbing went forward at the demand of the White House—"without a signature from the Department of Justice attesting as to its legality," he testified.

What was the mysterious program that had so alarmed Comey? Political blogs buzzed for weeks with speculation. Though Comey testified that the program was subsequently readjusted to satisfy his concerns, one can't help wondering whether the unspecified alteration would satisfy constitutional experts, or even average citizens. Faced with push-back from his bosses at the White House, did he simply relent and accept a token concession? Two months after Comey's testimony to Congress, the New York Times reported a tantalizing detail: The program that prompted him "to threaten resignation involved computer searches through massive electronic databases." The larger mystery remained intact, however. "It is not known precisely why searching the databases, or data mining, raised such a furious legal debate," the article conceded.

Another clue came from a rather unexpected source: President Bush himself. Addressing the nation from the Oval Office in 2005 after the first disclosures of the NSA's warrantless electronic surveillance became public, Bush insisted that the spying program in question was reviewed "every 45 days" as part of planning to assess threats to "the continuity of our government."

Few Americans—professional journalists included—know anything about so-called Continuity of Government (COG) programs, so it's no surprise that the president's passing reference received almost no attention. COG resides in a nebulous legal realm, encompassing national emergency plans that would trigger the takeover of the country by extra-constitutional forces—and effectively suspend the republic. In short, it's a road map for martial law.

While Comey, who left the Department of Justice in 2005, has steadfastly refused to comment further on the matter, a number of former government employees and intelligence sources with independent knowledge of domestic surveillance operations claim the program that caused the flap between Comey and the White House was related to a database of Americans who might be considered potential threats in the event of a national emergency. Sources familiar with the program say that the government's data gathering has been overzealous and probably conducted in violation of federal law and the protection from unreasonable search and seizure guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.

According to a senior government official who served with high-level security clearances in five administrations, "There exists a database of Americans, who, often for the slightest and most trivial reason, are considered unfriendly, and who, in a time of panic, might be incarcerated. The database can identify and locate perceived 'enemies of the state' almost instantaneously." He and other sources tell Radar that the database is sometimes referred to by the code name Main Core. One knowledgeable source claims that 8 million Americans are now listed in Main Core as potentially suspect. In the event of a national emergency, these people could be subject to everything from heightened surveillance and tracking to direct questioning and possibly even detention.

Of course, federal law is somewhat vague as to what might constitute a "national emergency." Executive orders issued over the past three decades define it as a "natural disaster, military attack, [or] technological or other emergency," while Department of Defense documents include eventualities like "riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, [and] disorder prejudicial to public law and order." According to one news report, even "national opposition to U.S. military invasion abroad" could be a trigger.

Let's imagine a harrowing scenario: coordinated bombings in several American cities culminating in a major blast—say, a suitcase nuke—in New York City. Thousands of civilians are dead. Commerce is paralyzed. A state of emergency is declared by the president. Continuity of Governance plans that were developed during the Cold War and aggressively revised since 9/11 go into effect. Surviving government officials are shuttled to protected underground complexes carved into the hills of Maryland, Virginia, and Pennsylvania. Power shifts to a "parallel government" that consists of scores of secretly preselected officials. (As far back as the 1980s, Donald Rumsfeld, then CEO of a pharmaceutical company, and Dick Cheney, then a congressman from Wyoming, were slated to step into key positions during a declared emergency.) The executive branch is the sole and absolute seat of authority, with Congress and the judiciary relegated to advisory roles at best. The country becomes, within a matter of hours, a police state.

Interestingly, plans drawn up during the Reagan administration suggest this parallel government would be ruling under authority given by law to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, home of the same hapless bunch that recently proved themselves unable to distribute water to desperate hurricane victims. The agency's incompetence in tackling natural disasters is less surprising when one considers that, since its inception in the 1970s, much of its focus has been on planning for the survival of the federal government in the wake of a decapitating nuclear strike.

Under law, during a national emergency, FEMA and its parent organization, the Department of Homeland Security, would be empowered to seize private and public property, all forms of transport, and all food supplies. The agency could dispatch military commanders to run state and local governments, and it could order the arrest of citizens without a warrant, holding them without trial for as long as the acting government deems necessary. From the comfortable perspective of peaceful times, such behavior by the government may seem far-fetched. But it was not so very long ago that FDR ordered 120,000 Japanese Americans—everyone from infants to the elderly—be held in detention camps for the duration of World War II. This is widely regarded as a shameful moment in U.S. history, a lesson learned. But a long trail of federal documents indicates that the possibility of large-scale detention has never quite been abandoned by federal authorities. Around the time of the 1968 race riots, for instance, a paper drawn up at the U.S. Army War College detailed plans for rounding up millions of "militants" and "American negroes," who were to be held at "assembly centers or relocation camps." In the late 1980s, the Austin American-Statesman and other publications reported the existence of 10 detention camp sites on military facilities nationwide, where hundreds of thousands of people could be held in the event of domestic political upheaval. More such facilities were commissioned in 2006, when Kellogg Brown & Root—then a subsidiary of Halliburton—was handed a $385 million contract to establish "temporary detention and processing capabilities" for the Department of Homeland Security. The contract is short on details, stating only that the facilities would be used for "an emergency influx of immigrants, or to support the rapid development of new programs." Just what those "new programs" might be is not specified.

In the days after our hypothetical terror attack, events might play out like this: With the population gripped by fear and anger, authorities undertake unprecedented actions in the name of public safety. Officials at the Department of Homeland Security begin actively scrutinizing people who—for a tremendously broad set of reasons—have been flagged in Main Core as potential domestic threats. Some of these individuals might receive a letter or a phone call, others a request to register with local authorities. Still others might hear a knock on the door and find police or armed soldiers outside. In some instances, the authorities might just ask a few questions. Other suspects might be arrested and escorted to federal holding facilities, where they could be detained without counsel until the state of emergency is no longer in effect.

It is, of course, appropriate for any government to plan for the worst. But when COG plans are shrouded in extreme secrecy, effectively unregulated by Congress or the courts, and married to an overreaching surveillance state—as seems to be the case with Main Core—even sober observers must weigh whether the protections put in place by the federal government are becoming more dangerous to America than any outside threat.

Another well-informed source—a former military operative regularly briefed by members of the intelligence community—says this particular program has roots going back at least to the 1980s and was set up with help from the Defense Intelligence Agency. He has been told that the program utilizes software that makes predictive judgments of targets' behavior and tracks their circle of associations with "social network analysis" and artificial intelligence modeling tools.

"The more data you have on a particular target, the better [the software] can predict what the target will do, where the target will go, who it will turn to for help," he says. "Main Core is the table of contents for all the illegal information that the U.S. government has [compiled] on specific targets." An intelligence expert who has been briefed by high-level contacts in the Department of Homeland Security confirms that a database of this sort exists, but adds that "it is less a mega-database than a way to search numerous other agency databases at the same time."

A host of publicly disclosed programs, sources say, now supply data to Main Core. Most notable are the NSA domestic surveillance programs, initiated in the wake of 9/11, typically referred to in press reports as "warrantless wiretapping."

In March, a front-page article in the Wall Street Journal shed further light onto the extraordinarily invasive scope of the NSA efforts: According to the Journal, the government can now electronically monitor "huge volumes of records of domestic e-mails and Internet searches, as well as bank transfers, credit card transactions, travel, and telephone records." Authorities employ "sophisticated software programs" to sift through the data, searching for "suspicious patterns." In effect, the program is a mass catalog of the private lives of Americans. And it's notable that the article hints at the possibility of programs like Main Core. "The [NSA] effort also ties into data from an ad-hoc collection of so-called black programs whose existence is undisclosed," the Journal reported, quoting unnamed officials. "Many of the programs in various agencies began years before the 9/11 attacks but have since been given greater reach."

The following information seems to be fair game for collection without a warrant: the e-mail addresses you send to and receive from, and the subject lines of those messages; the phone numbers you dial, the numbers that dial in to your line, and the durations of the calls; the Internet sites you visit and the keywords in your Web searches; the destinations of the airline tickets you buy; the amounts and locations of your ATM withdrawals; and the goods and services you purchase on credit cards. All of this information is archived on government supercomputers and, according to sources, also fed into the Main Core database.

Main Core also allegedly draws on four smaller databases that, in turn, cull from federal, state, and local "intelligence" reports; print and broadcast media; financial records; "commercial databases"; and unidentified "private sector entities." Additional information comes from a database known as the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, which generates watch lists from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence for use by airlines, law enforcement, and border posts. According to the Washington Post, the Terrorist Identities list has quadrupled in size between 2003 and 2007 to include about 435,000 names. The FBI's Terrorist Screening Center border crossing list, which listed 755,000 persons as of fall 2007, grows by 200,000 names a year. A former NSA officer tells Radar that the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, using an electronic-funds transfer surveillance program, also contributes data to Main Core, as does a Pentagon program that was created in 2002 to monitor antiwar protesters and environmental activists such as Greenpeace.

If previous FEMA and FBI lists are any indication, the Main Core database includes dissidents and activists of various stripes, political and tax protesters, lawyers and professors, publishers and journalists, gun owners, illegal aliens, foreign nationals, and a great many other harmless, average people.

A veteran CIA intelligence analyst who maintains active high-level clearances and serves as an advisor to the Department of Defense in the field of emerging technology tells Radar that during the 2004 hospital room drama, James Comey expressed concern over how this secret database was being used "to accumulate otherwise private data on non-targeted U.S. citizens for use at a future time." Though not specifically familiar with the name Main Core, he adds, "What was being requested of Comey for legal approval was exactly what a Main Core story would be." A source regularly briefed by people inside the intelligence community adds: "Comey had discovered that President Bush had authorized NSA to use a highly classified and compartmentalized Continuity of Government database on Americans in computerized searches of its domestic intercepts. [Comey] had concluded that the use of that 'Main Core' database compromised the legality of the overall NSA domestic surveillance project."

If Main Core does exist, says Philip Giraldi, a former CIA counterterrorism officer and an outspoken critic of the agency, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is its likely home. "If a master list is being compiled, it would have to be in a place where there are no legal issues"—the CIA and FBI would be restricted by oversight and accountability laws—"so I suspect it is at DHS, which as far as I know operates with no such restraints." Giraldi notes that DHS already maintains a central list of suspected terrorists and has been freely adding people who pose no reasonable threat to domestic security. "It's clear that DHS has the mandate for controlling and owning master lists. The process is not transparent, and the criteria for getting on the list are not clear." Giraldi continues, "I am certain that the content of such a master list [as Main Core] would not be carefully vetted, and there would be many names on it for many reasons—quite likely including the two of us."

Would Main Core in fact be legal? According to constitutional scholar Bruce Fein, who served as associate deputy attorney general under Ronald Reagan, the question of legality is murky: "In the event of a national emergency, the executive branch simply assumes these powers"—the powers to collect domestic intelligence and draw up detention lists, for example—"if Congress doesn't explicitly prohibit it. It's really up to Congress to put these things to rest, and Congress has not done so." Fein adds that it is virtually impossible to contest the legality of these kinds of data collection and spy programs in court "when there are no criminal prosecutions and [there is] no notice to persons on the president's 'enemies list.' That means if Congress remains invertebrate, the law will be whatever the president says it is—even in secret. He will be the judge on his own powers and invariably rule in his own favor."

The veteran CIA intelligence analyst notes that Comey's suggestion that the offending elements of the program were dropped could be misleading: "Bush [may have gone ahead and] signed it as a National Intelligence Finding anyway."

But even if we never face a national emergency, the mere existence of the database is a matter of concern. "The capacity for future use of this information against the American people is so great as to be virtually unfathomable," the senior government official says.

In any case, mass watch lists of domestic citizens may do nothing to make us safer from terrorism. Jeff Jonas, chief scientist at IBM, a world-renowned expert in data mining, contends that such efforts won't prevent terrorist conspiracies. "Because there is so little historical terrorist event data," Jonas tells Radar, "there is not enough volume to create precise predictions."

The overzealous compilation of a domestic watch list is not unique in postwar American history. In 1950, the FBI, under the notoriously paranoid J. Edgar Hoover, began to "accumulate the names, identities, and activities" of suspect American citizens in a rapidly expanding "security index," according to declassified documents. In a letter to the Truman White House, Hoover stated that in the event of certain emergency situations, suspect individuals would be held in detention camps overseen by "the National Military Establishment." By 1960, a congressional investigation later revealed, the FBI list of suspicious persons included "professors, teachers, and educators; labor-union organizers and leaders; writers, lecturers, newsmen, and others in the mass-media field; lawyers, doctors, and scientists; other potentially influential persons on a local or national level; [and] individuals who could potentially furnish financial or material aid" to unnamed "subversive elements." This same FBI "security index" was allegedly maintained and updated into the 1980s, when it was reportedly transferred to the control of none other than FEMA (though the FBI denied this at the time).

FEMA, however—then known as the Federal Preparedness Agency—already had its own domestic surveillance system in place, according to a 1975 investigation by Senator John V. Tunney of California. Tunney, the son of heavyweight boxing champion Gene Tunney and the inspiration for Robert Redford's character in the film The Candidate, found that the agency maintained electronic dossiers on at least 100,000 Americans that contained information gleaned from wide-ranging computerized surveillance. The database was located in the agency's secret underground city at Mount Weather, near the town of Bluemont, Virginia. The senator's findings were confirmed in a 1976 investigation by the Progressive magazine, which found that the Mount Weather computers "can obtain millions of pieces [of] information on the personal lives of American citizens by tapping the data stored at any of the 96 Federal Relocation Centers"—a reference to other classified facilities. According to the Progressive, Mount Weather's databases were run "without any set of stated rules or regulations. Its surveillance program remains secret even from the leaders of the House and the Senate."

Ten years later, a new round of government martial law plans came to light. A report in the Miami Herald contended that Reagan loyalist and Iran-Contra conspirator Colonel Oliver North had spearheaded the development of a "secret contingency plan,"—code-named REX 84—which called "for suspension of the Constitution, turning control of the United States over to FEMA, [and the] appointment of military commanders to run state and local governments." The North plan also reportedly called for the detention of upwards of 400,000 illegal aliens and an undisclosed number of American citizens in at least 10 military facilities maintained as potential holding camps.

North's program was so sensitive in nature that when Texas congressman Jack Brooks attempted to question North about it during the 1987 Iran-Contra hearings, he was rebuffed even by his fellow legislators. "I read in Miami papers and several others that there had been a plan by that same agency [FEMA] that would suspend the American Constitution," Brooks said. "I was deeply concerned about that and wondered if that was the area in which he [North] had worked." Senator Daniel Inouye, chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Iran, immediately cut off his colleague, saying, "That question touches upon a highly sensitive and classified area, so may I request that you not touch upon that, sir." Though Brooks pushed for an answer, the line of questioning was not allowed to proceed.

Wired magazine turned up additional damaging information, revealing in 1993 that North, operating from a secure White House site, allegedly employed a software database program called PROMIS (ostensibly as part of the REX 84 plan). PROMIS, which has a strange and controversial history, was designed to track individuals—prisoners, for example—by pulling together information from disparate databases into a single record. According to Wired, "Using the computers in his command center, North tracked dissidents and potential troublemakers within the United States. Compared to PROMIS, Richard Nixon's enemies list or Senator Joe McCarthy's blacklist look downright crude." Sources have suggested to Radar that government databases tracking Americans today, including Main Core, could still have PROMIS-based legacy code from the days when North was running his programs.

In the wake of 9/11, domestic surveillance programs of all sorts expanded dramatically. As one well-placed source in the intelligence community puts it, "The gloves seemed to come off." What is not yet clear is what sort of still-undisclosed programs may have been authorized by the Bush White House. Marty Lederman, a high-level official at the Department of Justice under Clinton, writing on a law blog last year, wondered, "How extreme were the programs they implemented [after 9/11]? How egregious was the lawbreaking?" Congress has tried, and mostly failed, to find out.

In July 2007 and again last August, Representative Peter DeFazio, a Democrat from Oregon and a senior member of the House Homeland Security Committee, sought access to the "classified annexes" of the Bush administration's Continuity of Government program. DeFazio's interest was prompted by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20 (also known as NSPD-51), issued in May 2007, which reserves for the executive branch the sole authority to decide what constitutes a national emergency and to determine when the emergency is over. DeFazio found this unnerving.

But he and other leaders of the Homeland Security Committee, including Chairman Bennie Thompson, a Mississippi Democrat, were denied a review of the Continuity of Government classified annexes. To this day, their calls for disclosure have been ignored by the White House. In a press release issued last August, DeFazio went public with his concerns that the NSPD-51 Continuity of Government plans are "extra-constitutional or unconstitutional." Around the same time, he told the Oregonian: "Maybe the people who think there's a conspiracy out there are right."

Congress itself has recently widened the path for both extra-constitutional detentions by the White House and the domestic use of military force during a national emergency. The Military Commissions Act of 2006 effectively suspended habeas corpus and freed up the executive branch to designate any American citizen an "enemy combatant" forfeiting all privileges accorded under the Bill of Rights. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, also passed in 2006, included a last-minute rider titled "Use of the Armed Forces in Major Public Emergencies," which allowed the deployment of U.S. military units not just to put down domestic insurrections—as permitted under posse comitatus and the Insurrection Act of 1807—but also to deal with a wide range of calamities, including "natural disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack, or incident."

More troubling, in 2002, Congress authorized funding for the U.S. Northern Command, or NORTHCOM, which, according to Washington Post military intelligence expert William Arkin, "allows for emergency military operations in the United States without civilian supervision or control."

"We are at the edge of a cliff and we're about to fall off," says constitutional lawyer and former Reagan administration official Bruce Fein. "To a national emergency planner, everybody looks like a danger to stability. There's no doubt that Congress would have the authority to denounce all this—for example, to refuse to appropriate money for the preparation of a list of U.S. citizens to be detained in the event of martial law. But Congress is the invertebrate branch. They say, 'We have to be cautious.' The same old crap you associate with cowards. None of this will change under a Democratic administration, unless you have exceptional statesmanship and the courage to stand up and say, 'You know, democracies accept certain risks that tyrannies do not.'"

As of this writing, DeFazio, Thompson, and the other 433 members of the House are debating the so-called Protect America Act, after a similar bill passed in the Senate. Despite its name, the act offers no protection for U.S. citizens; instead, it would immunize from litigation U.S. telecom giants for colluding with the government in the surveillance of Americans to feed the hungry maw of databases like Main Core. The Protect America Act would legalize programs that appear to be unconstitutional.

Meanwhile, the mystery of James Comey's testimony has disappeared in the morass of election year coverage. None of the leading presidential candidates have been asked the questions that are so profoundly pertinent to the future of the country: As president, will you continue aggressive domestic surveillance programs in the vein of the Bush administration? Will you release the COG blueprints that Representatives DeFazio and Thompson were not allowed to read? What does it suggest about the state of the nation that the U.S. is now ranked by worldwide civil liberties groups as an "endemic surveillance society," alongside repressive regimes such as China and Russia? How can a democracy thrive with a massive apparatus of spying technology deployed against every act of political expression, private or public? (Radar put these questions to spokespeople for the McCain, Obama, and Clinton campaigns, but at press time had yet to receive any responses.)

These days, it's rare to hear a voice like that of Senator Frank Church, who in the 1970s led the explosive investigations into U.S. domestic intelligence crimes that prompted the very reforms now being eroded. "The technological capacity that the intelligence community has given the government could enable it to impose total tyranny," Church pointed out in 1975. "And there would be no way to fight back, because the most careful effort to combine together in resistance to the government, no matter how privately it was done, is within the reach of the government to know."

UPDATE: Since this article went to press, several documents have emerged to suggest the story has longer legs than we thought. Most troubling among these is an October 2001 Justice Department memo that detailed the extra-constitutional powers the U.S. military might invoke during domestic operations following a terrorist attack. In the memo, John Yoo, then deputy assistant attorney general, "concluded that the Fourth Amendment had no application to domestic military operations." (Yoo, as most readers know, is author of the infamous Torture Memo that, in bizarro fashion, rejiggers the definition of "legal" torture to allow pretty much anything short of murder.) In the October 2001 memo, Yoo refers to a classified DOJ document titled "Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities Within the United States." According to the Associated Press, "Exactly what domestic military action was covered by the October memo is unclear. But federal documents indicate that the memo relates to the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program." Attorney General John Mukasey last month refused to clarify before Congress whether the Yoo memo was still in force.

Meanwhile, congressional sources tell Radar that Congressman Peter DeFazio has apparently abandoned his effort to get to the bottom of the White House COG classified annexes. Penny Dodge, DeFazio's chief of staff, says otherwise. "We will be sending a letter requesting a classified briefing soon," she told Radar this week.

Pandora's Box No Gift to Area

Kathryn Spann
Herald Sun
May 20, 2008

The Consortium that wants to bring Homeland Security’s National Bio and Agro- Defense Facility, or NBAF, to North Carolina trumpets the benefits it will bring to this state, and downplays the potential consequences. They advise us to wait until Homeland Security issues its Environmental Impact Statement to learn what the worst case scenario will be if one of those diseases escapes the lab. (...)

But what’s the best case scenario? On closer examination, it’s not the rosy picture that NBAF’s local promoters claim. They tell us it will bring up to 500 jobs, which is wide of the mark: Homeland Security says the NBAF will employ a maximum of 350. And who’s getting those jobs? In Homeland Security’s recent “town hall meeting,” NBAF program manager James Johnson said that scientists and lab technicians at the existing lab in Plum Island, New York will get first dibs on the jobs at the NBAF — not North Carolina residents.

Johnson also told us that the non-scientific jobs will probably be staffed by a private contractor, most likely Alaskan-owned Field Support Services, Inc. FSSI’s Web site touts its operation of Plum Island’s power plant/utilities node, its management, maintenance and repair of the facility, including the bio-containment systems and incinerator, and its provision of facility security guards. Presumably, the reason to have these services performed by an outside contractor is because they can do so more cheaply than the government, without the burden of federal benefits and job security. But what happens to those jobs and our safety when they need to cut costs to meet their profit goals?

Speaking of jobs, where did the Consortium’s number of 1,000 to 1,500 construction jobs come from? Not from Homeland Security. Even assuming that number is right, how many of these jobs are “in and out,” like excavators, pavers and roofers? Those trades will be at the site for a few months at best. And will a North Carolina construction firm get the job? An Atlanta architect has already been hired to provide the design services for the NBAF. A Missouri-based construction company did the work on the new BSL-4 lab at the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta. Nothing requires or predicts that an in-state construction firm will be awarded the NBAF job.

What about the $1.65 billion over 20 years that the Consortium says NBAF will bring to North Carolina? They rely on a one-page analysis prepared by the North Carolina Department of Commerce. We can’t see from that one page all of the assumptions the Department of Commerce used, but some mistakes jump out. They left out all the costs to the taxpayers. Where’s the cost of the 100-plus acres of state land we’ve promised Homeland Security? Also missing are the costs of roadway improvements, additional burdens on water and sewer infrastructure and training first responders for a new situation, all of which our taxpayers must bear.

The department’s analysis also swings wide on the number of jobs at NBAF, assuming 400 jobs instead of Homeland Security’s 250-350 estimate. They stretch it even farther, crediting the NBAF with a total of 732 jobs, all treated as having the same economic impact. They multiply this woefully inaccurate job number to get their $1.65 billion estimate.

Commerce’s economic model was designed for use in deciding whether to award multi-million dollar taxpayer-funded “Job Development Incentive Grants” to large corporations considering building a facility in North Carolina. This model has been widely criticized because it results in a much higher calculation of economic benefits than other states’ models. The result is that we promise too much taxpayer money to lure corporations here like when North Carolina offered Dell $242 million to build here when the next highest offer was $37 million from Virginia.

But the NBAF doesn’t even promise the same benefits that a corporate facility might. As a government entity, it won’t pay property or income taxes to the state. And its operations — infectious diseases research — do not include the production of a salable product or service. In short, NBAF is not in the business of making money.

However, NBAF wants a lot of money from North Carolina’s taxpayers. Homeland Security recently asked the state to pick up the tab on an unpublished wish list of items, including a power plant/utilities hub for the NBAF with a ballpark cost of $100 million. State leaders, to their credit, have declined to promise a power plant, but what about the rest of the wish list? And if the federal government cannot budget adequately for NBAF’s construction, how can we expect adequate funding for maintenance over its 50-year lifespan?

The Consortium suggests that NBAF will be good for our $60 billion a year agriculture industry because it will be able to diagnose foreign animal diseases more rapidly than an out-of-state lab. But the Rollins Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory in Raleigh, which was founded in 1950 to diagnose livestock diseases and prevent “outbreaks of catastrophic foreign animal disease by early detection,” expects to have the ability to diagnose foot-and-mouth disease, the most financially devastating threat to the livestock industry, within the year — long before NBAF would be finished.

Indeed, NBAF would bring those catastrophic foreign animal diseases to North Carolina for the first time. Not one of the eight diseases Homeland Security lists as NBAF examples exists in the mainland U.S. What happens to the state’s economy if those diseases get out? Last year, an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in England was traced to a sewer leak at a government high-containment biolab. Though the losses from that outbreak are still being tallied, a 2001 outbreak led to the slaughter of more than 6 million animals and the loss of more than $16 billion. The only outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the U.S. since 1929 occurred at Plum Island and was luckily contained by the island’s ocean perimeter.

North Carolina’s taxpayers and elected officials don’t need to wait for the EIS to know that the NBAF is no gift to our state.

[Durham native Kathryn Spann recently returned to northern Durham County to run a family farm after years as a commercial and constitutional lawyer in New York City.]

Over 100,000 Executed by South Korea at Advent of Korean War

Massacre denied for half a century.

Stephen Soldz
Psyche, Science, and Society
May 19, 2008

The Associated Press is reporting on recent revelations that early in the Korean War the South Korean government, with US acquiescence, murdered 100,000-200,000 of its citizens suspected of possible leftist sympathies. These executions occurred in scenes of mass death, with thousands of detainees lined up in front of trenches and shot, checked to make sure they were dead, and then pushed into mass graves and covered over. (...)

"With U.S. military officers sometimes present, and as North Korean invaders pushed down the peninsula, the southern army and police emptied South Korean prisons, lined up detainees and shot them in the head, dumping the bodies into hastily dug trenches. Others were thrown into abandoned mines or into the sea. Women and children were among those killed. Many victims never faced charges or trial.

"The mass executions — intended to keep possible southern leftists from reinforcing the northerners — were carried out over mere weeks and were largely hidden from history for a half-century."

In recent years these mass graves have started to be excavated by a South Korean Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Commission is also investigating hundreds of reports of American massacres of civilians, mainly through air strikes:

"The 17 investigators of the commission’s subcommittee on “mass civilian sacrifice,” led by Kim, have been dealing with petitions from more than 7,000 South Koreans, involving some 1,200 alleged incidents — not just mass planned executions, but also 215 cases in which the U.S. military is accused of the indiscriminate killing of South Korean civilians in 1950-51, usually in air attacks."

American military officials had control of the South Korean military and could have stopped the massacres but chose not to:

"The declassified record of U.S. documents shows an ambivalent American attitude toward the killings. American diplomats that summer urged restraint on southern officials — to no obvious effect — but a State Department cable that fall said overall commander Gen. Douglas MacArthur viewed the executions as a Korean “internal matter,” even though he controlled South Korea’s military.

"Ninety miles south of Seoul, here in the narrow, peaceful valley of Sannae, truckloads of prisoners were brought in from Daejeon Prison and elsewhere day after day in July 1950, as the North Koreans bore down on the city.

"The American photos, taken by an Army major and kept classified for a half-century, show the macabre sequence of events.

"White-clad detainees — bent, submissive, with hands bound — were thrown down prone, jammed side by side, on the edge of a long trench. South Korean military and national policemen then stepped up behind, pointed their rifles at the backs of their heads and fired. The bodies were tipped into the trench.

"Trembling policemen — “they hadn’t shot anyone before” — were sometimes off-target, leaving men wounded but alive, Lee said. He and others were ordered to check for wounded and finish them off."

Very important to keep in mind is that these crimes were vigorously denied by Korean and American officials for half a century. While many Korean family members of the executed and other knew of the murder of 100,000 of their citizens, they were too afraid of being labelled “leftist” to speak. In many cases they destroyed all pictures and other remnants of their dead family members to protect the family. Those who tried to publicly reveal the killings were harassed:

"Among the Koreans who witnessed, took part in or lost family members to the mass killings, the events were hardly hidden, but they became a “public secret,” barely whispered about through four decades of right-wing dictatorship here.

“The family couldn’t talk about it, or we’d be stigmatized as leftists,” said Kim Chong-hyun, 70, leader of an organization of families seeking redress for their loved ones’ deaths in 1950.

"Kim, whose father was shot and buried in a mass grave outside the central city of Daejeon, noted that in 1960-61, a one-year democratic interlude in South Korea, family groups began investigating wartime atrocities. But a military coup closed that window, and “the leaders of those organizations were arrested and punished.”

"Then, “from 1961 to 1988, nobody could challenge the regime, to try again to reveal these hidden truths,” said Park Myung-lim of Seoul’s Yonsei University, a leading Korean War historian. As a doctoral student in the late 1980s, when South Korea was moving toward democracy, Park was among the few scholars to begin researching the mass killings. He was regularly harassed by the police."

The US and British government denied the reports and censored or attacked those few reporters and others who tried to reveal the massacres:

"Scattered reports of the killings did emerge in 1950 — and some did not.
British journalist James Cameron wrote about mass prisoner shootings in the South Korean port city of Busan — then spelled Pusan — for London’s Picture Post magazine in the fall of 1950, but publisher Edward Hulton ordered the story removed at the last minute.

"Earlier, correspondent Alan Winnington reported on the shooting of thousands of prisoners at Daejeon in the British communist newspaper The Daily Worker, only to have his reporting denounced by the U.S. Embassy in London as an “atrocity fabrication.” The British Cabinet then briefly considered laying treason charges against Winnington, historian Jon Halliday has written.

"Associated Press correspondent O.H.P. King reported on the shooting of 60 political prisoners in Suwon, south of Seoul, and wrote in a later memoir he was “shocked that American officers were unconcerned” by questions he raised about due process for the detainees.

"Some U.S. officers — and U.S. diplomats — were among others who reported on the killings. But their classified reports were kept secret for decades."

These incidents should remind us yet again, as if another reminder were needed, that war is always horrifying, that civilians are regularly considered enemies to be destroyed in modern warfare. the myth of the clean war is exactly that, a myth created to justify that which is unjustifiable. As one of the executioners described his thoughts as he finished off one victim who had survived the first shot:

"I thought, there should never again be war."

Another lesson of these massacres and the ability of governments to suppress the knowledge of them for decades is that, when it comes to atrocities, governments lie. All governments lie. While this does not mean that all claims of atrocities are true, those who give credence to official denials, who treat those denials as “evidence”, as anything other than the propaganda they are, are themselves abetting the atrocities of the state. Only a truly inquisitive press and an aroused citizenry constitute a partial check of government denial and deceit. We should remember this elementary fact as we evaluate the many claims of atrocities in Iraq.

Blogger Valtin, who wrote about these massacres last night, has called for an American Truth & Reconcilliation Commission to investigate “full extent of U.S. involved war crimes.” I concur with this position. Only if our country somehow comes to terms with our role in many late 20th century horrors do we have a chance of choosing a different path. To stay on the path of denial is to remain in the service of death.

A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations

A Review of the FBI's Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan,and Iraq (Part 1 of 2)

graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/washington/20080521_DETAIN_report.pdf

The above link is to a 400plus page report (partly classified) prepared regarding FBI involvement and observation of the FBI in Gitmo, Iraq and Afghanistan. -- The executive summary is quite descriptive - I'm posting it in two parts

Part 1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.INTRODUCTION

This Executive Summary summarizes the results of the review conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ)Office of the Inspector General (OIG)regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) involvement in and observations of detainee interrogations in Guantanamo Bay (GTMO),Afghanistan,and Iraq.The focus of our review was whether FBI agents witnessed incidents of detainee abuse in the military zones,whether FBI employees reported any such abuse to their superiors or others,and how those reports were handled.The OIG also examined whether FBI employees participated in any detainee abuse.In addition,we examined the development and adequacy of the policies,guidance,and training that the FBI provided to the agents it deployed to the military zones. (...)

As part of our review,the OIG developed and distributed a detailed survey to over 1,000 FBI employees who had deployed to one or more of the military zones.Among other things,the OIG survey sought information regarding observations or knowledge of specifically listed interview or interrogation techniques and other types of detainee treatment,and whether the FBI employees reported such incidents to their FBI supervisors or others.2

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footnote1 The OIG has redacted (blacked out)from the public version of this report information that the FBI,the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),or the Department of Defense (DOD)considered classified.We have provided full versions of the classified reports to the Department of Justice,the CIA,the DOD,and Congressional committees. The effort to identify classified information in this report has been a significant factor delaying release of this report.To obtain the agencies'classification comments,we provided a draft report to the FBI,the CIA,and the DOD for classification review on October 25,2007.The FBI and the CIA provided timely responses.The DOD's response was not timely.Eventually,the DOD provided initial classification comments to us on March 28,2008.However,we believed those classification markings were over-inclusive.After several additional weeks of discussion with the DOD about these issues,the DOD provided revised classification comments.The DOD's delay in providing comments,and its over-inclusive initial comments,delayed release of this report.
2 Although a major focus of our investigation was to collect information about the observations by FBI agents of DOD interrogation practices in the military zones,the OIG did not attempt to make an ultimate factual determination regarding the alleged misconduct by non-FBI personnel.Such a determination would have exceeded the DOJ OIG's jurisdiction.Moreover,the OIG did not have access to all of the witnesses,such as DOD or CIA personnel,who would have been necessary to make such a determination.
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The OIG also interviewed more than 230 witnesses and reviewed over 500,000 pages of documents provided by the FBI,other components of the Department of Justice (DOJ),and the Department of Defense (DOD).OIG employees made two trips to GTMO to tour the detention facilities,review documents,and interview witnesses,including five detainees held there.We also interviewed one released detainee by telephone.3

Our review focused primarily on the activities and observations of FBI agents deployed to military facilities under the control of the Department of Defense between 2001 and 2004.With limited exceptions,we were unable to and did not investigate the conduct or observations of FBI agents regarding detainees held at CIA facilities for several reasons.First,we were unable to obtain highly classified information about CIA-controlled facilities,what occurred there,and what legal authorities governed their operations.Second,during the course of our review we learned that in January 2003 the CIA Inspector General had initiated a review of the CIA terrorist detention and interrogation program.Therefore,our review focused mainly on the conduct and observations of the approximately 1,000 FBI employees related to detainee interviews in military zones.

A.ORGANIZATION OF REPORT

The OIG's complete report,which contains the full results of our review,has been classified by the relevant government agencies at the Top Secret/SCI level.The full report contains 12 chapters.The first three chapters provide introductory and background information, including a description of the role of the FBI in the military zones and the various FBI interrogation policies in place at the time of the September 11 attacks.Chapter Four discusses the FBI's involvement in the joint interrogation of a "high value detainee,"Zayn Abidin Muhammed Hussein Abu Zubaydah,shortly after his capture,and the subsequent deliberations within the FBI regarding the participation of its agents in joint interrogations with agencies that did not follow FBI interview policies.4 Chapter Five examines the dispute between the FBI and the DOD regarding the treatment of another detainee held at GTMO, Muhammad Al-Qahtani.The dispute regarding Al-Qahtani arose from the tension between the differing interrogation techniques employed by the FBI and the military.This dispute was elevated to higher-level officials and eventually resolved in favor of the DOD's approach. Chapter Six examines the FBI's response to the public disclosure of detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and related concerns expressed by FBI agents in the military zones.These responses included issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy,which reminded FBI agents not to use force,threats,or abuse in detainee interviews and instructed FBI agents not to participate in joint interviews in which other agencies were using techniques that were not in compliance with FBI rules.The FBI also conducted an internal review to determine the extent of the FBI's knowledge regarding detainee mistreatment.The seventh chapter discusses the communication of FBI policies to FBI employees who were deployed in military zones,including the FBI's efforts to provide training and guidance to its agents on appropriate interrogation techniques.

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footnote3 In addition,the OIG examined prior reports addressing the issue of detainee treatment in the military zones.Among the most significant of those reports were the Church Report,a review of DOD interrogation operations conducted in 2004 and 2005 by the DOD,and the Schmidt-Furlow Report,a DOD investigation in 2005 into allegations of detainee abuse at GTMO.

4 When the OIG investigative team was preparing for its trip to GTMO in early 2007,we asked the DOD for permission to interview several detainees,including Zubaydah.The DOD agreed,stating that our interviews would not interfere with their attempts to obtain any intelligence from the detainees,including Zubaydah.However, the CIA Acting General Counsel obiected to our interviewing Zubavdah. In addition,the CIA Acting General Counsel asserted that the OIG had not persuaded him that the OIG had a "demonstrable and immediate need to interview Zubaydah at that time"given what the Acting General Counsel understood to be the OIG's "investigative mandate."In addition,the CIA Acting General Counsel asserted that Zubaydah could make false allegations against CIA employees.We believe that none of these reasons were persuasive or warranted denying us access to Zubaydah.First,neither the FBI nor the DOD objected to our access to Zubaydah at that time.In addition,neither the FBI nor the DOD stated that an OIG interview would interfere with their interviews of him. Second,at GTMO we were given access to other high value detainees.Third,we did have a demonstrable and immediate need to interview Zubaydah at that time,as well as the other detainees who we were given access to,notwithstanding the CIA Acting General Counsel's position that we had not persuaded him.Finally,the fact that Zubaydah could make false allegations against CIA employees -as could other detainees -was not in our view a legitimate reason to object to our access to him.In sum,we believe that the CIA's reasons for objecting to OIG access to Zubaydah were unwarranted,and its lack of cooperation hampered our investigation.
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Chapters Eight,Nine,and Ten detail the results of the OIG's survey and investigation into what FBI agents saw,heard about,and reported with respect to detainee interrogations in GTMO,Afghanistan, and Iraq.

Chapter Eleven discusses our investigation of eight separate allegations that FBI agents in the military zones were involved in detainee abuse or mistreatment.

Chapter Twelve presents the OIG's conclusions and recommendations.

B.SUMMARY OF OIG CONCLUSIONS

Our report found that after FBI agents in GTMO and other military zones were confronted with interrogators from other agencies who used more aggressive interrogation techniques than the techniques that the FBI had successfully employed for many years,the FBI decided that it would not participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other agencies in which techniques not allowed by the FBI were used.

Our review determined that the vast majority of FBI agents complied with FBI interview policies and separated themselves from interrogators who used non-FBI techniques.In a few instances,FBI agents used or participated in interrogations during which techniques were used that would not normally be permitted in the United States. These incidents were infrequent and were sometimes related to the unfamiliar circumstances agents encountered in the military zones. They in no way resembled the incidents of detainee mistreatment that occurred at Abu Ghraib.

However,FBI agents continued to witness interrogation techniques by other agencies that caused them concern.Some of these concerns were reported to their supervisors,which sometimes resulted in friction between FBI and the military over the use of these interrogation techniques on detainees.Some FBI agents'concerns were resolved directly by the agents working with their military counterparts,while other concerns were never reported.Ultimately,however,the DOD made the decisions regarding which interrogation techniques could be used on the detainees in military zones.In our report,we describe the types of techniques that FBI employees reported to their supervisors.

We also concluded that the FBI had not provided sufficient guidance to its agents on how to respond when confronted with military interrogators who used interrogation techniques that were not permitted by FBI policies.

In sum,while our report concluded that the FBI could have provided clearer guidance earlier,and while the FBI and DOJ could have pressed harder for resolution of FBI concerns about detainee treatment, we believe the FBI should be credited for its conduct and professionalism iv

in detainee interrogations in the military zones and in generally avoiding participation in detainee abuse.

The remainder of this unclassified Executive Summary summarizes in more detail the factual background and findings contained in our full report.

II.FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As a result of the September 11 attacks,the FBI changed its top priority to counterterrorism and preventing terrorist attacks in the United States.As a consequence of this shift in its priorities,and in recognition of the FBI's investigative expertise and familiarity with al-Qaeda,the FBI became more involved in collecting intelligence and evidence overseas,particularly in military zones in Afghanistan,at GTMO,and in Iraq.

Beginning in December 2001,the FBI sent a small number of agents and other employees to Afghanistan to obtain actionable intelligence for its counterterrorism efforts,primarily by interviewing detainees at various facilities.In January 2002,the military began transferring "illegal enemy combatants"from Afghanistan to GTMO,and the FBI began deploying personnel to GTMO to obtain further intelligence and evidence from detainees in cooperation with military interrogators. Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003,the FBI also sent agents and other employees to Iraq for the primary objective of collecting and analyzing information to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States and to protect U.S.personnel or interests overseas.

FBI deployments in the military zones peaked at approximately 25 employees in Afghanistan,30 at GTMO,and 60 in Iraq at any one time between 2001 and the end of 2004,the period covered by our review.In total,more than 200 FBI employees served in Afghanistan between late 2001 and the end of 2004,more than 500 employees served at GTMO during this period,and more than 260 served in Iraq.In each military zone,FBI agents were supervised by an FBI On-Scene Commander.

III.FBI AND DOD INTERROGATION POLICIES

A.FBI POLICIES PRIOR TO THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS

Most of the FBI's written policies regarding permissible interrogation techniques for its agents and for its agents'conduct in collaborative or foreign interviews were developed prior to the September 11 attacks.When these policies were drafted,they reflected the FBI's primary focus on domestic law enforcement,which emphasized obtaining information for use in investigating and prosecuting crimes. These policies are designed to ensure that witness statements met legal and constitutional requirements of voluntariness so that they would be admissible in U.S.courts.In addition,the FBI has consistently stated its belief that the most effective way to obtain accurate information is to use rapport-building techniques in interviews.

CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS

The FBI's Legal Handbook for Special Agents states,among other things,that "[i ]t is the policy of the FBI that no attempt be made to obtain a statement by force,threats,or promises." The FBI's Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures (MAOP) describes the importance of FBI agents not engaging in certain activities when conducting investigative activities,including foreign counterintelligence,and specifically states that "[n ]o brutality,physical violence,duress or intimidation of individuals by our employees will be countenanced ...."

JOINT INTERVIEWS

Prior to the September 11 attacks,the FBI had policies for working with other government agencies,both domestic and foreign,in joint or cooperative investigations.However,the FBI's work with the military in GTMO,Afghanistan,and Iraq raised new issues regarding which agency's interrogation policies would apply and how the FBI would work with personnel from other agencies who operated under different interrogation rules.FBI agents told us that they have always been trained to adhere to FBI protocols,not to other agencies'rules with respect to interview policies or evidence collection.

However,the FBI's expanded mission after the September 11 attacks gave rise to circumstances in which (1)entities other than the FBI were the lead agencies and had custody of the witnesses,(2) prosecution of crimes was not necessarily the primary goal of the interrogations,and (3)the evidentiary rules of U.S.Article III courts did not necessarily apply.As a consequence and as detailed below,existing FBI policies were not always sufficient to address these circumstances. Reporting Misconduct FBI policies prior to the September 11 attacks required FBI agents to report to FBI Headquarters any incidents of misconduct or improper performance by other FBI employees. However,the duty of an FBI employee to report on the activities of non- FBI government personnel was limited to criminal behavior by other personnel.We did not find any FBI policy prior to May 2004 imposing an obligation on FBI employees to report abuse or mistreatment of detainees by non-FBI government employees falling short of a crime.

B.DOD INTERROGATION POLICIES

In our report,we summarize the detainee interrogation policies adopted by the DOD after the September 11 attacks for prisoners and detainees.These policies were generally developed for use in war zones rather than in the law-enforcement context.The range of permissible DOD techniques was expanded after the September 11 attacks and was modified over time.These military policies permitted techniques that were inconsistent with the FBI's longstanding approach towards witness interrogations.

Although DOD policies were not applicable to FBI agents,they were relevant to our report for several reasons.First,as detailed below, the tensions between DOD policies and the FBI's interview policies created concerns for some FBI agents in the military zones which sometimes led to conflicts between FBI and DOD employees.

Second,FBI agents in the military zones had a unique opportunity to observe the conduct of other agencies'interrogators,including conduct related to alleged detainee abuse in GTMO,Iraq,and other detention facilities.A significant portion of our review involved the FBI's observations regarding the treatment of detainees by military interrogators.Because military interrogators were governed by the DOD's interrogation policies,these policies are relevant to the OIG's report.

Third,in May 2004 the FBI instructed its agents to report to their superiors any incidents of known or suspected abuse or mistreatment of detainees by other agencies'interrogators.Some FBI agents were told that they should report any abusive interrogation technique that the agent believed was outside the legal authority of the interrogator.This instruction required FBI agents to have some familiarity with other agencies'policies,which we briefly summarize below.

DOD POLICIES FOR GTMO

When interrogations began at GTMO in January 2002,military interrogators relied on Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation,for guidance as to permissible interrogation techniques.In additional to conventional direct questioning techniques, Field Manual 34-52 permitted military interrogators to utilize methods that,depending on the manner of their use,might not be permitted under FBI policies,such as "Fear Up (Harsh),"defined as exploiting a detainee's pre-existing fears including behaving in an overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice.On December 2,2002,the Secretary of Defense approved additional techniques for use on detainees at GTMO,including stress positions for a maximum of 4 hours,isolation, deprivation of light and auditory stimuli,hooding,20-hour interrogations,removal of clothing,and exploiting a detainee's individual phobias (such as fear of dogs).

On January 15,2003,the Secretary of Defense rescinded his approval of these techniques.On April 16,2003,the Secretary of Defense promulgated revised guidance approving 24 techniques for use at GTMO,most of which were taken from or closely resembled those in Field Manual 34-52.The April 2003 GTMO Policy also approved the use of dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation,sleep adjustment, and isolation.This policy continued in effect for GTMO until September 2006 when the U.S.Army issued Field Manual 2-22.3,discussed below. DOD Policies for Afghanistan Prior to 2003,the only official guidance regarding military detainee interrogation techniques in effect in Afghanistan was that contained in Field Manual 34-52.In early 2003, the military followed a policy that permitted techniques similar to those approved under the December 2002 GTMO Policy,including isolation, sleep adjustment, hooding,stress positions,sensory deprivation,and mild physical contact.In February 2003,after a military investigation into two detainee deaths at the Bagram Collection Point in December 2002,the military revised its approved,interrogation tactics and prohibited handcuffing as a means to enforce sleep deprivation and physical contact for interrogation purposes.

In March 2004 the military issued a new policy for Afghanistan interrogations that was based on the prior Afghanistan policies and the April 2003 GTMO Policy.This policy added dietary manipulation and environmental manipulation to the list of approved techniques and relaxed the prior prohibitions on using stress positions as an incentive for cooperation.In June 2004,in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib disclosures,the military in Afghanistan adopted the same policy that was issued for Iraq on May 13,2004 (discussed below).

DOD POLICIES FOR IRAQ

For the first few months of the war in Iraq, military interrogators were governed by Field Manual 34-52.In September 2003,the DOD adopted a policy describing 29 permissible interrogation techniques.Most were adopted nearly verbatim from the April 2003 GTMO Policy approved by the Secretary of Defense,but additional approved techniques included muzzled military working dogs, sleep management,yelling,loud music,light control,and stress positions for up to 1 hour per use.

On October 12,2003,the Commander in Iraq rescinded approval for several of these techniques.On May 13,2004,in the wake of the Abu Ghraib abuse revelations,the military further revised its policies to specify that "under no circumstances"would requests for certain techniques be approved,including "sleep management,stress positions, change of scenery,diet manipulation,environment manipulation,or sensory deprivation."In January 2005,the military adopted an interrogation policy for Iraq that approved only those techniques listed in Field Manual 34-52,with additional safeguards,prohibitions,and clarifications,including explicit prohibitions against the removal of clothing and the use or presence of military working dogs during interrogations.

FIELD MANUAL 2-22.3

In September 2006,the U.S.Army issued Field Manual 2-22.3 in fulfillment of a mandate of the Detainee Treatment Act,enacted in December 2005,requiring a uniform standard for treatment of detainees under DOD custody.Field Manual 2-22.3 reiterated and elaborated on many of the techniques listed in its predecessor,Field Manual 34-52,but placed much greater emphasis on rapport-based interrogation techniques similar to those endorsed by the FBI.It also identified several prohibited actions,including nudity,sexual acts or poses,beatings,waterboarding,use of military dogs,and deprivation of food or water.Field Manual 2-22.3 also placed specific controls on the use of the technique of isolating detainees from other detainees.However,Field Manual 2-22.3 was not in effect during any part of the period that was the focus of the OIG's review.

IV.THE INTERROGATION OF ZUBAYDAH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY FBI POLICIES REGARDING DETAINEE INTERVIEWS IN THE MILITARY ZONES

In the spring of 2002,the FBI began addressing the need for specific policies governing the conduct of its agents during detainee interrogations overseas.This need came to light in connection with the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah,a "high value detainee"then being held by the CIA.Zubaydah had been severely wounded when he was captured,and two FBI agents were assigned to assist the CIA in obtaining intelligence from him while he was recovering from his injuries. The FBI agents conducted the initial interviews of Zubaydah,assisting in his care and developing rapport with him.However,when the CIA interrogators arrived at the site they assumed control of the interrogation.After observing the CIA use interrogation techniques that undoubtedly would not be permitted under FBI interview policies,one of the FBI agents expressed strong concerns about these techniques to senior officials in the Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters. This agent's reports led to discussions at FBI Headquarters and with the DOJ and the CIA about the FBI's role in joint interrogations with other agencies.Ultimately,these discussions resulted in a determination by FBI Director Robert Mueller in approximately August 2002 that the FBI would not participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other agencies in which harsh or extreme techniques not allowed by the FBI would be employed.

However,the issue arose again in late 2002 and early 2003 in connection with the FBI's efforts to gain access to another high value detainee held in a foreign location.FBI agents assisted another agency in developing questions for this detainee during a period when he was being subjected to interrogation techniques that FBI.agents would not be allowed to use in the United States.5

V.FBI CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY INTERROGATIONS AT GTMO

Late in 2002,FBI agents assigned to GTMO also began raising questions to FBI Headquarters regarding harsh interrogation techniques being us